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Equal Performance of Minority and Majority
Coalitions? Pledge Fulﬁlment in the German State
of NRW
THERES MATTHIEß
This study examines how a government’s majority status affects coalition govern-
ance and performance. Two steps are investigated: the inclusion of government
parties’ electoral pledges into the coalition agreement, and the ability to translate
pledges into legislative outputs. The main results of a comparative analysis of 183
pledges of a minority (without a formal support partner) and majority coalition in
the German State North Rhine-Westphalia indicate that government parties with
minority status include fewer pledges in the coalition agreement. But this does not
mean that they also perform badly at pledge fulﬁlment. In fact, they show an
equivalent performance in fulﬁlling election pledges, at least partially, when com-
pared to majority government parties. However, there is tentative evidence that
the prime minister’s party shows a lower quality of pledge fulﬁlment, as measured
by a higher share of partially enacted pledges.
INTRODUCTION
Political parties in Germany are used to forming stable coalitions that have a secure
majority in parliament. This has been conﬁrmed yet again after the recent German
federal elections in 2017: instead of forming a minority government that would have
been a viable alternative, the former government parties CDU/CSU and SPD agreed
to revive the grand coalition, despite the social democratic party leader Martin Schulz
repeating several times after the elections that his party would not join another. At
the German state level, however, there is some precedent for minority governments:
in Saxony Anhalt, the SPD twice formed a minority government that was tolerated
by the Left Party (1994–98, 1998–2002), and in 2010 the Social Democrats and the
Green Party joined a minority coalition in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). The
latter especially attracted a lot of attention because it was a ‘real minority government’
and did not rely on a stable support partner. Consequently, it had to form alternating
coalitions with changing support partners among the opposition parties. At face
value, the red-green minority coalition formed in NRW conﬁrms the previous held
general belief that minority governments are unstable, weak and symbols of political
crisis (Beyme 1970; Johnson 1975, 87; Steffani 1997). The minority government
abruptly ended after two years of existence on 14 March 2012. The government
parties failed as a result of lack of support for what is considered the most distinguished
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privilege in parliament: the budget. However, this is not necessarily informative about
how the minority coalition performed during the time it was in ofﬁce. This article
studies the legislative work of this NRW-minority coalition in comparison to its preced-
ing majority coalition at the party level. Do the minority and majority coalitions display
equal performance?
This study contributes to the empirical and theoretical debate on minority govern-
ment’s performance. With the pioneering work of Strøm (1990), previous negative pre-
conceptions of minority governments have largely been diminished. Strøm has argued
that the formation of a government without a secure majority in parliament might be a
rational choice for political parties, and found that minority governments work effec-
tively in various countries such as Norway, where most governments have no majority
in parliament. This has also been supported by other scholars, such as Mayhew (2005)
in relation to the United States and Conley (2011) in relation to Canada. Crombez has
suggested that ‘minority governments are signs of the largest party’s strength’ and not of
its weakness, given that the government parties in question control the median legislator
(1996, 1). For a long time, empirical studies analysing a government’s performance in
dependence of its majority status that go beyond a purely quantitative record of laws
passed were absent. Building upon the normative concept of democratic promissory
representation as proposed by Mansbridge (2003), scholars from the Comparative
Party Pledges Project (CPPP) have only recently analysed whether parties are able to
successfully enact the policies that they had promised before elections to their voters.
These ﬁndings suggest that minority governments, when compared to majority govern-
ments, are not at a disadvantage in translating their election pledges into policy output.
I draw on these previous studies on pledge fulﬁlment. The substantive research value
of this article stems from the following three elements. First, it concentrates on the central
arena of decision making, the parliament. Recent studies have investigated fulﬁlment
while relying on various documents and sources external to parliament. In this study,
pledge fulﬁlment is traced directly back to parliamentary party responsibility – and not
to extra-parliamentary events or actors. Legislative enactments are the ultimate challenge
for minority governments that have to ﬁnd additional support in order to pass laws.
Second, this article studies pledge fulﬁlment in coalitions and acknowledges that there
is an intermediate stage: the agreement between the coalition partners. More than one
third of West European governments are minority governments, and out of that a
further one third are minority coalitions (Müller and Strøm 2003). Considering the
double challenge involving majority building (intra-coalitional and legislative), minority
coalitions make a compelling research topic.1 The study of minority coalitions can teach
us how majority building and agreements between coalition partners operate in situations
of large uncertainty. Third, while previous research has mostly focused on the national
level, this study provides an analysis at the regional-state level and is thereby relevant
to debates on federalism and multi-level governance. So far, pledge fulﬁlment at the
regional level has been studied only in Canada (Pétry et al. 2015; Pétry and Duval 2015).
This article takes an explorative, theoretically guided stance and seeks to reveal
more information about legislative performance of a minority coalition when compared
to a majority coalition at two stages: the coalition agreement and the legislative output.
For the ﬁrst stage, I argue that minority government parties include fewer pledges in
their coalition agreement in order to manage uncertainty and avoid failure. For the
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second stage, there are arguments both supporting and opposing that idea that minority
and majority coalitions perform equally in terms of pledge fulﬁlment. Based on the
pledges approach from the CPPP, who deﬁne pledges as ‘commitments in parties’ pro-
grammes to carry out certain policies’ (Thomson et al. 2017, 528),2 I have identiﬁed 183
electoral pledges on education, which is the most important policy ﬁeld for regional
governments. The results indicate that the minority governments parties studied
include fewer pledges in their coalition agreement, but display the same performance
in at least partially fulﬁlling election pledges within the available time of two years.
There is also some suggestion that the quality of pledge fulﬁlment is lower for the min-
ority government’s large coalition party, as measured by a higher share of only partially
and not fully fulﬁlled pledges. These ﬁndings have major implications for understand-
ing legislative effectiveness and political representation in times of high uncertainty in
majority building in parliament (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2010).
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the process of coalition
governance and pledge fulﬁlment in minority coalitions and formulates working
hypotheses that guide the analysis. Section 3 describes the methods and introduces
the data and selected cases. Section 4 presents the empirical results concerning the
two stages: the support of a pledge in the coalition agreement and its legislative enact-
ment depending on a government’s majority status by balancing quantitative and quali-
tative presentations of the data. The ﬁnal section summarises the results, infers
implications, and suggests where further research is needed.
COALITION GOVERNANCE AND PLEDGE FULFILMENT OF MINORITY AND MAJORITY
COALITIONS
Before elaborating more thoroughly on the role that a government’s majority status
might exert on coalition governance and pledge fulﬁlment, it is necessary to clarify
how substantive minority coalitions, as the type of government that this study is inter-
ested in, are deﬁned. Substantive minority coalitions are governments that are composed
of at least two parties, lack a majority in parliament and do not have a stable support
partner, and as such can form legislative coalitions with different support partners. In
contrast, the functioning of minority governments with stable support is often very
similar to majority governments, and consequently, they are also called ‘hidden
majority governments’ (Strøm 1990, 1997, 56; Bale and Bergman 2006).
It is useful to think of two stages when considering pledge fulﬁlment of government
parties in coalitions: the coalition agreement and the ﬁnal policy output. The process of
election pledge fulﬁlment of a single party majority government is straightforward: it
can commit itself to a policy agenda before elections, and as soon as it is in ofﬁce, it
can enact the policies listed in its electoral programme – with the condition that there
are no other veto players. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the highest
rates of pledge fulﬁlment are found in countries with single-party governments, such
as the UK. In countries where coalition governments are usually formed, such as
Germany or the Netherlands, the rate of fulﬁlled pledges is much lower (Thomson
et al. 2017). Since coalition partners have to agree on a common agenda, they cannot
directly enact what they have individually promised before elections. Usually, the
agreement on this common agenda takes place before they enter government, and the
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coalition agreement represents this inter-party agreement. I consider these two stages –
the coalition agreement and the ﬁnal policy output – when looking at pledge fulﬁlment
of government parties in coalitions with two different majority statuses. At which of
these two stages does a government’s majority status have an effect?
Transferring Election Pledges Into the Coalition Agreement
Before election pledges are enacted, they have to go through an intra-coalitional ﬁlter:
the coalition agreement. According to models of coalition theory and cabinet govern-
ance, coalition agreements are key elements of mutual control between parties in a
coalition. Drafting a coalition agreement is an ex ante control instrument that prevents
any shifting of the coalition partner from ever occurring, in particular in policy areas for
which that partner controls the ministry. Once in power, there is an immediate risk that
cabinet ministers act as agents of their own parties, rather than of the whole cabinet.
From this perspective, the coalition agreement is a means to prevent agency problems.
It represents a formal understanding between the coalition partners, who will keep tabs
on each other and monitor compliance with the coalition treaty (Thies 2001; Müller and
Strøm 2003; Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Strøm, Müller, and Smith 2010). If the
coalition agreement is just a contract between the coalition partners in which the gov-
ernment parties agree on a common agenda after elections in order to prevent mutual
shifts, there should be no difference between minority and majority coalitions when
controlling for the ideological distance between parties.
However, there is serious doubt as to whether coalition agreements have an equal
meaning for both minority and majority government parties. Christiansen and Pedersen
(2014) have argued and shown that for Denmark, majority governments’ coalition agree-
ments largely pre-regulate policy outputs because they have high certainty and predict-
ability. For substantive minority coalitions the empirical evidence is less clear, but they
appear to have a tendency towards a ‘compromise-strategy’: laws that are passed during a
minority coalition’s term are less likely to be pre-regulated in a coalition agreement.
Coalition agreements of minority governments set the agenda of the parliament, but
parts of the coalition partner’s policy proposals must still be renegotiated. Thus, if pol-
icies contained in coalition agreements have a lower chance of being translated into
outputs, there is also reason to assume that the preceding drafting of a coalition agreement
differs between government parties with and without a secure majority in parliament.
Drafting a coalition agreement comprises two steps: ﬁrst, deciding whether to draft a
coalition treaty, and second, setting the scope of this treaty (Indridason and Kristinsson
2013, 826). Since the writing of coalition agreement is nowadays well established in
Germany (Kim and Loewenberg 2005, 1110), and for the cases selected in this analysis
coalition agreements have indeed been drafted, I concentrate on the second part of the
decision, regarding the scope of the contracts.3 Of course, coalition agreements are
always incomplete arrangements that do not pre-regulate all issues that the future gov-
ernment has to take care of because many events are not predictable (Müller and Strøm
2010, 177). However, when drafting a coalition agreement, there is a still a choice to be
made by coalition partners on how extensive it should be.
Minority coalitions are in situations of great uncertainty: they must not only reach an
intra-coalitional agreement after elections, but also rely on support of one or more oppo-
sition parties in parliament in order to form legislative coalitions. According to
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Indridason and Kristinsson (2013), in situations of great uncertainty the desire to have as
many issues stipulated as possible is very high, so coalition agreements from minority
government parties should be more comprehensive. However, this prediction only con-
siders that a minority government’s coalition agreement is more extensive when it has a
stable support partner so that desired policies, not just from government parties but also
from the support partner, are included in the coalition agreement. Nothing is said about
the scope of a coalition agreement when a minority coalition builds ad hoc coalitions to
pass laws.4 Drafting an extensive coalition agreement with many pre-regulations con-
cerning legislation is a risky choice for substantial minority coalitions. The likelihood
of failing to implement pre-formulated policies included in the coalition agreement is
very high. Failure to implement promised policies reduces a government’s credibility
from a voter’s perspective, and consequently might result in electoral loss, which
explains why most parties have strong incentives to keep their pledges formulated in
election and coalition programmes (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Ara-
gonès, Postlewaite, and Palfrey 2007; Indridason and Kristinsson 2013, 825; Eichorst
2014).5 Thus, when considering that government parties want to avoid failure,
instead of pre-regulating as much as possible in the coalition agreement, minority gov-
ernment parties who have no stable support partner might instead act with restraint when
drafting their coalition agreement.6 In addition, their coalition agreement sends signals
to the opposition parties. A formulation of a coalition agreement of narrow scope with
few pre-regulations implies an open negotiation-arena for all actors in parliament. When
opposition parties are confronted with strongly pre-regulated policies, they might have
little incentive to engage in discussions with minority governments parties (Strøm
1990). In accordance with this argument, minority coalitions would be expected to
draft a coalition agreement of narrow scope. I call this ‘auto-limitation’: the government
parties act with restraint when drafting the coalition agreement, even with regard to the
inclusion of policies on which they agree upon. Consequently, I expect that the minority
government parties are less likely to list their election pledges in the coalition agreement
in comparison to the majority government parties.
H1 (auto-limitation): A minority government is less likely to include government
parties’ election pledges in its coalition agreement, when compared to a majority
government.
Translating Election Pledges Into Legislative Output
In relation to the second stage of pledge fulﬁlment, this study examines the legislative
output produced by the minority and majority coalition. This means looking at whether
each party’s election pledges have been legislatively enacted. The reasons for focusing
on legislative enactments are that such regulations have higher democratic legitimation,
are more sustainable, and compose more fundamental changes when compared to del-
egated legislation. Primary legislation is the ultimate challenge for minority govern-
ments because it requires approval by a majority in parliament, which in contrast is
not necessary for delegated legislation. This means that minority government parties
must ﬁnd support partners among opposition parties in order to enact legislation in
accordance with their preferred policy projects, as formulated in their electoral
programmes.7
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There are arguments both supporting and opposing the idea that minority and
majority governments perform equally well at fulﬁlling pledges. The expectation of
an equal performance depends on the government parties’ bargaining power. When con-
sidering whether a minority government is in a powerful bargaining position, two
crucial conditions should be examined: whether they occupy the median position,
and the extent of their agenda power, including for example the right of last amendment
(Laver and Shepsle 1990; Crombez 1996; Tsebelis 2002; Ganghof et al. 2012). Agenda
power and the control of the median legislator allow for the formation of dynamic and
issue-speciﬁc legislative coalitions. In a standard spatial model, given the assumption
that opposition parties are motivated by reasons solely to do with policy, a centrally
located minority government might even be able to choose a support partner for its pre-
ferred policy change: right-wing parties will support changing a left-wing status quo
towards a more right-wing policy, and vice versa. As a result, minority governments
can enact laws in accordance with their own preferences (Tsebelis 2002, 97–99;
Ward and Weale 2010; Ganghof et al. 2012, 888f). This means that government
parties with and without a secure majority in parliament should be able to translate
their election pledges into legislative outputs to the same degree – given that the gov-
ernment has a strong bargaining position, which as will be shown later, was the case
with the minority coalition in NRW.
However, even if minority governments have positional advantages and agenda
power, they might be restricted when translating their preferred policies outputs. Oppo-
sition parties – as potential support partners of minority governments – might not con-
sider just their policy motives when evaluating their willingness to cooperate in the
legislative arena. Ganghof and Bräuninger (2006) have argued that a party’s policy-
based utility function is conditional on expected consequences, such as losses in
future elections. Even if minority governments have positional power, they may
struggle to ﬁnd support for their proposals when opposition parties have a low sacriﬁce
ratio, that is, ‘the maximal policy sacriﬁce the actor is willing to make relative to its
policy ambition’ (Ganghof and Bräuninger 2006, 525). A low sacriﬁce ratio is associ-
ated with opposition parties that have realistic chances of becoming part of a future gov-
ernment. Consider an opposition party with an ideological position very different to that
of the minority government. If it has a low sacriﬁce ratio, because for example it con-
siders itself to have a chance of becoming part of a future government, then it may not
support a legislative proposal that moves the status quo to the minority government’s
preferred policy, even if according to standard spatial models it would record relative
policy gains from this policy change. Thus, opposition parties that have low sacriﬁce
ratios ‘will not simply help the government to pass its own programme, but try to
extract signiﬁcant concessions’ (Ganghof and Bräuninger 2006, 526). In this situation,
agenda power and a central location are not sufﬁcient conditions for minority govern-
ments to ﬁnd support partners for legislative coalitions and to directly enact bills in
accordance with their preferences. When opposition parties have low sacriﬁce ratios,
minority government parties need to make compromises on their own propositions to
ﬁnd support – and consequently, they will have lower rates on pledge fulﬁlment.
To summarise the discussion, I formulate two working hypotheses that guide the
empirical analysis:
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H2a (equal performance): Given a strong bargaining position, a minority govern-
ment performs equally well in relation to election pledge fulﬁlment as a majority
government.
H2b (concessions): Despite a strong bargaining position, a minority government
tends to have a poorer performance on election pledge fulﬁlment when compared
to a majority government, when opposition parties have a low sacriﬁce ratio.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The Minority and Majority Coalition in NRW
I compare the performance of two coalitions in relation to educational pledges: the min-
ority government composed of the Social Democrats and the Green Party, who were in
ofﬁce after the elections in 2010, and the preceding majority government of the Chris-
tian Democratic Union and the Liberals, formed in 2005 in NRW. This section ﬁrst
introduces the minority government with regard to the theoretical considerations pre-
sented above, and then justiﬁes the case selection for conducting a comparative analysis.
First, the red-green coalition was a substantial and powerful minority government. It
did not rely on a stable support partner, and government and opposition parties were
willing to negotiate with each other (Klecha 2010, 162; Ganghof et al. 2012; Vielstädte
2013, 119). The minority government was in a strong negotiating position because of
positional advantages, agenda power and parliamentary seats occupied by the coalition
parties. It was located in the centre of the ideological space. Among the parties that
entered the parliament after the elections in 2010, the Social Democratic Party occupied
the median position (Bräuninger and Debus 2012, 118). Due to this positional advan-
tage the SPD conducted the coalition negotiations and ﬁnally, formed a minority gov-
ernment with the Green Party. Additionally, the minority had agenda power. According
to article 68 of the state constitution of NRW it is the government’s right to hold a refer-
endum, for example, if the parliament rejects one of its legislative propositions. The
only way to avoid a referendum is the election of a new prime minister – which was
very unlikely during the 15th legislative term since none of the other candidates were
expected to receive a necessary majority in parliament. Moreover, the minority govern-
ment was only one seat short of an absolute parliamentary majority. In the case of the
abstention of one opposition party (or at least two opposition members), the minority
government could pass bills in the legislation process (Grunden 2011).
In addition, there was an imminent danger that re-elections would need to be held,
and especially the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) and the Left Party were not inter-
ested in holding new elections as they feared failing to meet the ﬁve percent threshold
and not re-entering the parliament (Ganghof et al. 2012, 898). In particular, the Left
Party was in an exceptional situation, as it had only entered the parliament in NRW
for the ﬁrst time in 2010. Thus, in contrast to the CDU and FDP, it was unlikely to
have any chance to be part of a future government, and so its motivation to participate
in policy-making and be accommodating was relatively high from the beginning. The
Left Party helped the social democrat Hannelore Kraft to be elected prime minister
by abstaining in the second ballot, and during the legislature most legislative coalitions
were formed with its support (Ganghof et al. 2012). The CDU’s willingness to
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cooperate and be accommodating might have been ambivalent. Both the CDU and SPD
received the same number of seats and wanted the ofﬁce of prime minister. The previous
prime minister Jürgen Rüttgers (CDU) indicated his intention to remain in ofﬁce by
either forming a grand coalition with the SPD or a Jamaica coalition with the FDP
and the Greens. The SPD however refused to support Rüttgers, instead desiring that
its own candidate Kraft occupy the position, and the FDP was not interested in
talking to the Greens after they had invited the Left Party together with the SPD to
coalition talks – and so that also failed in the end. In summary, the minority government
appears to have had good prospects for enacting its preferred policies: it was centrally
located, possessed a signiﬁcant amount of agenda power, and the Left Party appears to
have had a high sacriﬁce ratio. Since the Left Party was located to the ideological left of
the coalition parties, it was inclined to be a legislative support partner that would help
government parties enact pledges that would move the status quo to the left. However,
the minority government’s bargaining power might also have been restricted due to the
lower sacriﬁce ratios possessed by the CDU and FDP. In instances where the SPD and
Greens wanted (or had) to form legislative majorities with one of the other two parties,
they might have been forced to make concessions.
Second, the majority and minority coalition in NRW selected for comparison make
it possible to control for a great degree of extraneous variance: the institutional and pol-
itical-cultural setting remains the same. Normally, researchers study the functioning of
minority governments in those countries where minority governments frequently occur,
such as in Scandinavia (Strøm 1990; Christiansen and Pedersen 2014; Klüver and
Zubek 2017). But institutions and behaviour patterns have adapted over the years in
these countries, lending bias to their results. For instance, the relationship between gov-
ernment and opposition parties has sometimes been institutionalised in the form of
formal agreements. As a consequence, minority governments gain stability but lose
ﬂexibility. In Germany, minority government formation is uncommon. At the federal
level, there are – aside from ‘caretaker governments’ – no examples of a minority gov-
ernment in ofﬁce. At the state level, two parties usually form a majority government
(Klecha 2010). All governments in North Rhine-Westphalia, except between 2010
and 2012, have had a majority in parliament and between 1946 and 2010, there have
only been four one-party governments as opposed to 17 coalition governments.
Hence, this study is conducted in an environment where minority governments are aty-
pical and therefore controls variables that are caused by institutional adaptations rather
than by a government’s majority status itself.8
Furthermore, the ideological distance between the coalition partners on the socio-
cultural dimension was similar for the minority and the majority government (Bräunin-
ger and Debus 2012, 188). Hence, the intra-coalitional conﬂict potential on the issue of
education was similar for both governments. Additionally, both coalitions succeeded
governments composed of different parties. Consequently, the status quo was far
away from many of the requested policy changes which facilitated policy change.
For example, the parties of the majority coalition committed to introducing tuition
fees at universities and to introducing behaviour grades – and could implement it.
The minority coalition parties abolished those measures.
This study focuses on pledges related to education because it is the most important
policy ﬁeld whose responsibility lies exclusively with the German states. In most policy
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areas the German federation and the states are shared sovereigns, whereas the federation
is exclusively responsible for matters of defence and foreign relations. For policies
dealing with culture and education however, the States of Germany have exclusive
responsibility (Art. 30 of the German Constitution). Education comprises various
issues from child care, education (primary school to university) and vocational training,
to research and science (Hepp 2011). In addition, there was signiﬁcant media attention
during the electoral campaign in NRW on educational issues (Burger 2010; Graalmann
and Schultz 2010; Spiegel 2010; Vitzthum 2010), and according to surveys, education
was (together with the labour market) the most important issue for voters in 2005 and
2010 in NRW (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2005, 2010).
This study controls for time. The minority coalition ended early after two years of
existence on 14 March 2012. In total, it was in ofﬁce 609 days. The fail of the minority
government was a consequence of budget rejection in parliament. Initially, the opposi-
tion parties did not want to reject the entire budget proposal. They instead wanted to
gain bargaining power by opposing one section of the government’s budget bill, but
were not aware of the fact that the denial of one section of the budget results in the rejec-
tion of the whole budget. Shortly before the parliamentary vote, a legal report informed
the parliament about the procedure, but the opposition nevertheless did not change its
strategy at the last minute (Ganghof et al. 2012). In order to obtain equivalent results,
I investigate only the ﬁrst two years of the majority coalition’s term. More speciﬁcally,
I analyse the legislative period before the 22 February 2010, which includes the adop-
tion of the budget for 2007.9
Measurement of Pledge Support in the Coalition Agreement and Pledge Fulﬁlment
In the ﬁrst step of the data collection, election pledges had to be identiﬁed before their
status – in terms of inclusion in the coalition agreement and fulﬁlment (the dependent
variables of interest) – could be determined. The quantity and quality of pledges differ
within and between electoral programmes (Naurin 2014). As a consequence, what a
pledge actually is (as it appears in this study) had to be clearly deﬁned. In total, 82 elec-
tion pledges from the government parties in the majority coalition (30 CDU, 52 FDP)
and 101 from those in the minority coalition have been identiﬁed (34 SPD, 67 The
Greens). As has been stated above, the study focuses on educational pledges in order
to ensure exclusive autonomy on decision making at the state level. Mere implemen-
tations of educational policies decided by the European Union or the German federal
government are not considered because the scope of political action by the regional gov-
ernment is enormously restricted.
Each pledge considered in this study is precise and comprised of an action as well as
a shift in the status quo. A pledge should offer a clear commitment and one should be
able to determine whether it was fulﬁlled: ‘A pledge is a statement committing a party to
an action or outcome that is testable: That is, we can gather evidence and make an argu-
ment that the action or outcome was either accomplished or not.’ (Thomson et al. 2017,
532, emphasis in original). An example of a vaguely formulated commitment that does
not meet the testability criteria and is therefore not deﬁned as a pledge is the following:
‘we support fair treatment for all’ (Thomson et al. 2017, 532). I exclude these types of
vague commitments. Furthermore, I focus on pledges that constitute an action, and
exclude those promises that constitute a goal but not the means (outcome pledges). It
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is doubtful that it can be determined whether the fulﬁlment of outcome pledges is really
caused by enacted policies.10 Additionally, I also exclude pledges favouring the status
quo in order to avoid biased results. It is easier for a party to enact status quo maintain-
ing commitments than pledges asking for a policy change (Costello and Thomson 2008,
250; Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik 2014, 577). It might be the case that the subject
was not discussed or that the parties could not agree on a new policy, and as a conse-
quence the status quo remained. In the data considered, all status quo maintaining
pledges were fulﬁlled, though more of these pledges originated from the majority gov-
ernment. Consequently, I focus on pledges requiring policy change and exclude status
quo maintaining pledges, in order to control for the effect of pledge type.
In the ﬁrst stage of the analysis, I considered whether a pledge was mentioned in the
coalition agreement. A pledge can be not supported, partially supported or fully sup-
ported in the coalition agreement. A pledge was identiﬁed as fully supported if the
coalition agreement fully reﬂected its ideas, for example the abolition of tuition fees
that was proposed by the SPD and Greens in 2010. The category of partial support
was used if the coalition agreement generally reﬂected a party’s favoured policy, but
did not encompass all aspects, had slight variations or was less concrete. For
example, the Greens promised in 2010 to introduce Islamic religious education in
school in German and to establish chairs at universities in NRW in order to train
those teachers of the Islamic religion. In the coalition agreement with the SPD, the inten-
tion to introduce Islamic religious classes held in German and supervised by German
school authorities was supported, but there were no details in relation to establishing
new chairs for ensuring the relevant training of teachers. A pledge was identiﬁed as
not supported if the policy mentioned in the electoral programme was not addressed
in the coalition agreement.
In determining the legislative enactment status of a pledge, I categorised each pledge
as either not fulﬁlled, partially fulﬁlled or fully fulﬁlled. A pledge is unfulﬁlled if no
‘signiﬁcant [legislative] action has taken place’ (Naurin 2014, 1052). Partial fulﬁlment
means that a party succeeded in signiﬁcantly changing the status quo but did not fully
achieve its objective. For example, the FDP promised in 2005 to introduce mandatory
German language tests for children one year before starting school, and if children fail,
language training for one year should be obligatory. The language test was introduced in
2006, but the additional language training was not mandatory. The coding decision of
the status of fulﬁlment was made on the basis of laws during the term of the minority
coalition (2010–12) and during the ﬁrst two years of the majority coalition’s term
(2005–07). The restriction to bills recognises the high degree of commitment of
pledge fulﬁlment required, and the importance of parliament as a crucial decision
making arena. Extra parliamentary agreements with non-democratically legitimised sta-
keholders, and non-legislative actions involving a lesser degree of commitment and not
requiring parliamentary conﬁrmation (secondary legislation) were excluded from the
analysis.
Measurement of Control Variables
Following the approach that has been suggested by CPPP-scholars (Thomson et al.
2017), I include a number of control variables which possibly obscure the relation
between the majority status and the two dependent variables. I consider the relations
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among pledges made by different parties. First, I control for intra-coalitional agreement.
Therefore, I identiﬁed whether a pledge was supported by all government parties. A
pledge that is supported by both government parties is more likely to be fulﬁlled than
a pledge that is supported by only one government party. Common pledges do not
require major intra-coalitional bargaining and therefore have a higher chance of being
enacted, shown by various studies (Thomson 2001; Kostadinova 2013; Schermann
and Ennser-Jedenastik 2014; Thomson et al. 2017). I identify a pledge as supported
if government parties generally agree on the favoured policy even if their preferred spe-
ciﬁcs vary slightly. For example. both coalition parties want more kindergarten, the SPD
asked for 10 new kindergarten and the Greens for 12. However, non-agreement is not
the same as disagreement between parties. It only means that a pledge of one party does
not correspond to a pledge of an-other party because the latter did not mention the policy
in its own electoral programme (Costello and Thomson 2008, 243). Still, I expect agree-
ment between government parties to positively inﬂuence the chance of a pledge to be
fulﬁlled.
I also consider the relation between pledges made by government and opposition
parties. I identiﬁed whether a pledge formulated by a government party was supported
by at least one opposition party. Especially for the minority government, agreement
with opposition parties might have increased the likelihood of a pledge to be fulﬁlled.11
Lastly, I consider whether or not a pledge originated from a government party
receiving the prime ministership or the relevant ministerial portfolio. According to
models of government formation, a party that receives the prime ministership has
greater control over legislation when compared to a junior partner (Austen-Smith and
Banks 1988). In the portfolio approach, a pledge is more likely to be fulﬁlled if a
party holds the relevant portfolios (Laver and Schoﬁeld 1990; Thomson et al. 2017,
530). During the minority government’s term, the social democratic Hannelore Kraft
was prime minister, and the Christian Democrat Jürgen Rüttgers was prime minister
of the majority coalition. The pledges from both governments were related to different
portfolios that were either controlled by the executive chief’s party or the junior partner.
Nearly half of all pledges from the minority government parties (48 from 101) were con-
cerned with school and training issues, for which the Green Party had ministerial power.
The SPD had responsibility for early childhood education, vocational training, and for
higher education and research. For the majority coalition, three quarters of pledges were
concerned with childhood education, school education, and vocational and continuous
training, over which the executive chief’s party, the CDU, had ministerial control. The
FDP was responsible for higher education and research.12
ANALYSES OF THE MINORITY AND MAJORITY COALITION IN NRW
For the analysis, two stages must be considered: both the inclusion of a pledge in the
coalition agreement and the legislative enactment of a pledge, in the context of a gov-
ernment’s majority status.
Support in Coalition Agreement
An initial look at the average percentages per government suggests that the minority
government differs from the majority coalition with regards to pledge support in the
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coalition agreement: the relative share of pledges that are at least partially supported in
the coalition agreement is higher by more than eight percent for the parties of the
majority government (50 vs 58 per cent).
Figure 1 breaks pledge support in coalition agreement and fulﬁlment down by party
and differentiates between partial and full support. It indicates that differences in sup-
porting pledges in the coalition agreement are also found at the party level. For both
governments, the large government parties holding the prime ministership have
higher rates of pledges supported by the coalition agreement than their junior partners.
However, between the CDU and SPD there is a difference of eight percent for the cat-
egory of at least partial support. In addition, for full support, not only the relative share
but also the total number of pledges is higher for the CDU. Likewise, when looking at
the junior partners, it becomes obvious that the FDP when compared to the Green Party
had the advantage when concluding its pledges in the coalition agreement with the
Christian Democrats.
The difference regarding the extent to which electoral pledges entered the coalition
agreement of both governments is especially interesting when considering that the
agreement at the pledge level amongst the minority government’s coalition partners
initially was higher than the majority government’s: 59 per cent for the SPD and 28
per cent for the Greens in contrast to 43 per cent for the CDU and 21 per cent for the
FDP. The minority government’s coalition agreement did not include the 20 per cent
of pledges common to both parties (four pledges of each party), whereas the coalition
FIGURE 1
PLEDGE SUPPORT IN COALITION AGREEMENT BY PARTY
Note: n = 183; each bar refers to all pledges made by one party; MajGov-Majority Government, MinGov-Minority govern-
ment; parties printed in bold hold the prime ministership; the white numbers in each bar indicate the total numbers of partially
and fully supported pledges.
Source: Own data.
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agreement of the majority government included all but one of their common pledges (96
per cent).
The results given by Figure 1 correlate with the multivariable binary regression
model in Table 1 that accounts for further hypothesised confounding variables, such
as the agreement between government parties at the pledge level. The model calculates
the odds ratio of a pledge being included in the coalition agreement (1 = partially/fully
supported; 0 = not supported), with respect to a government’s majority status. Each of
the 183 observations refers to one of the educational pledges that has been identiﬁed.
The parties in the minority government are the reference category. The odds ratio of
2.31 for the variable majority government indicates that the odds of pledge fulﬁlment
are 131 per cent higher for the majority than for the minority government. The model
also reveals that agreement between the coalition partners has a strong, signiﬁcant
effect. The coefﬁcients for the other variables – agreement with the opposition parties
and control of resources (prime minister and ministry) – are also positive, but much
weaker and not statistically signiﬁcant.13
Pledge Fulﬁlment
A descriptive comparison of the average percentages of pledge fulﬁlment per govern-
ment suggests that there is no substantial difference between the minority and majority
government: for both governments, 32 per cent of the pledges were at least partially ful-
ﬁlled. The low rates of pledge fulﬁlment indicate that the majority of pledges remained
unfulﬁlled: 70 of 101 pledges from the minority government parties and 57 of 82
pledges from the majority government parties. In comparison with other studies that
show average enactment rates of 60 per cent, this is relatively low. Though, this is
not surprising on account of the shortened legislative term of two years instead of ﬁve.
TABLE 1
EXPLAINING SUPPORT OF PLEDGES IN THE COALITION AGREEMENT
Majority government 2.31*
(2.14)
Agreement between:
Government parties 13.038***
(5.75)
Government and opposition parties 1.338
(0.64)
Prime minister 1.451
(0.93)
Ministry 1.585
(1.24)
Mc Fadden R2 0.239
Chi2(5) 60.57
N 183
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
Note: Figures are odds ratios obtained from binary logistic regression with dependent variable partially/fully
supported = 1 and not supported = 0. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own data.
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Figure 2 reveals a more detailed view on the status of pledge fulﬁlment by party. For
the junior partners, the rates of pledge fulﬁlment are similar; the Green Party even
slightly outperforms the FDP in absolute and relative numbers. For the large parties,
when full and partial fulﬁlment are taken together – as is usually done by pledge scho-
lars (Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik 2014; Thomson et al. 2017) – there is no differ-
ence between the CDU and SPD.
The multivariable model in Table 2 also support that the parties in the majority gov-
ernment do not show a better performance on pledge performance when compared to
those of the minority government. Table 2 reports the results of two binary logistic
regressions that calculate the odds ratios of a pledge being enacted (1 = full/partial ful-
ﬁlment; 0 = non-fulﬁlment), with respect to a government’s majority status while con-
trolling for other factors. Model B adds support of a pledge in the coalition agreement as
an additional predictor. Both models suggest that minority and majority governments
perform equally in terms of pledge fulﬁlment: pledges supported by the majority gov-
ernment parties do not have higher odds of being enacted than those supported by the
minority government parties. Apart from ‘prime minister’, the effects of the control vari-
ables are consistent with results of recent studies: agreement between government
parties has a strongly positively effect on pledge enactment, and so does pledge
support in coalition agreements (model B).14 The variables considering whether the
pledge-making party holds the prime ministership or relevant ministry, and if an oppo-
sition party supports a pledge, do not or only marginally inﬂuence the odds ratio of leg-
islative pledge enactment.15 Consequently, it appears that there is no substantial
FIGURE 2
PLEDGE FULFILMENT BY PARTY
Note: n = 183; the dashed line represents the average pledge fulﬁlment as shown by previous studies (Pétry and Duval 2015;
Thomson et al. 2017).
Source: own data.
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difference in performance on party pledge fulﬁlment when a government does not have
a majority in parliament.
However, Figure 2 also includes information on the quality of pledge fulﬁlment
(partial vs full fulﬁlment). It suggests that the chief executive’s party of the minority
government, the SPD, was at a disadvantage with regards to fully translating its
pledges into legislative outputs, when compared with the CDU. Nearly one third of
all CDU pledges are fully fulﬁlled, whereas the share of full fulﬁlment for the SPD is
much lower with 18 per cent. It is worth taking a closer look at these partial fulﬁlments.
Four of the six partially enacted SPD-pledges were also supported by coalition
partner the Greens, and three among these were fully supported in the coalition agree-
ment. One of these pledges concerns the structure of the school system in NRW – an
issue that had attracted a lot of attention during the electoral campaign and for which
all parties had formulated positions in their manifestos. The SPD pledged to enter a
new era of the school system and to switch from the existing model to a ‘school of
future’. The existing school model consisted of joint learning until the 4th grade, and
after that pupils were allocated to different schools with varying educational levels
depending on their performance. The SPD wanted to expand the period of joint learning
to make it compulsory until the 6th grade, and after that voluntary, if desired by parents
and teachers. Therefore, the different existing secondary schools (Hauptschule,
Realschule, and Gymnasium) would be brought together into one school type, so
called ‘Gemeinschaftsschulen’. The Greens supported the establishment of
Gemeinschaftsschulen, but promised a longer period of compulsory joint teaching –
until the 10th grade. The CDU, in contrast, stated in its electoral programme they
TABLE 2
BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR EXPLAINING PLEDGE FULFILMENT
Model A Model B
Majority government 1.134
(0.41)
0.888
(0.34)
Agreement between:
Government parties 3.301**
(1.2)
1.1577
(0.64)
Government and opposition parties 1.035
(0.42)
0.984
(0.41)
Coalition agreement – 5.145***
(2.2)
Prime minister 0.999
(0.37)
0.904
(0.35)
Ministry 1.009
(0.35)
0.864
(0.32)
Mc Fadden R2 0.057 0.128
Chi2(p) 60.57 28.77
N 183 183
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
Note: Figures are odds ratios obtained from binary logistic regression with dependent variable partly/fully
fulﬁlled = 1 and unfulﬁlled = 0. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: own data.
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would maintain the existing structured secondary school system. In the end, the govern-
ment reached a compromise: the ‘school consensus’, with the CDU demanding con-
cessions from the SPD as well from the Greens. The structured system was not
abolished, but ‘Sekundarschulen’ were introduced as an additional school type.
Sekundarschulen offered joint teaching until the 6th grade, and after that pupils
could attend schools of different education levels. At ﬁrst, one might have expected
a different outcome. Initially the government did indeed want to establish
Gemeinschaftsschulen without any legal basis, but the constitutional court declared
this as unlawful. In reaction to this, the government drafted a bill in order to enact
its vision. If just considering the parties’ policy motives, the Left Party would have
been the most likely support partner in implementing the government’s school
project.16 But the government withdrew this proposal, and shortly thereafter
another bill jointly drafted with the CDU was introduced and ﬁnally passed as the
6th amendment of the school law in 2011. There were also additional motivations
leading to this agreement. Concurrent with the revision of the legislation, changes
in the NRW-constitution were made, for which a two-third majority in parliament
(that the minority government only reached with support of the CDU) was necessary.
Thus, during the tough negotiations on the school issue, the power and ﬂexibility of
the minority government was obviously restricted. But the agreement also forced con-
cessions from the CDU, who had initially not wanted to change anything. The school
consensus that was ﬁnally reached resolved a protracted conﬂict over the school
system. The involved parliamentary parties were interested in an agreement amount-
ing to a sustainable and cross-wing compromise, and the ﬁnal outcome demanded
concession from all parties.
CONCLUSION
Returning to the initial question: did the minority and the majority coalitions in NRW
perform equally? This study has shown that the minority and its preceding majority
coalition performed equally in terms of at least partially enacting each government
party’s policy proposals as legislation – a result that ﬁts with previous studies . This
study has contributed to the debate by analysing legislative performance of a real min-
ority coalition – neither with a pre-election agreement between the coalition partners nor
a stable support partner among the opposition – at the regional level.
In addition, the results suggest that the quality of pledge fulﬁlment of a party is
related to whether that party holds the position of prime minister. More pledges
from the SPD in the minority government were only partially and not fully fulﬁlled
when compared to the CDU. A more thorough look at one of the most important com-
promises that the Social Democrats and the Greens reached with the Christian Demo-
cratic Union in 2011, the ‘school consensus’, shows that the CDU, which had a low
sacriﬁce ratio, was able to extract signiﬁcant concessions from the government
parties. However, this particular agreement was a compromise for all parties and
also required concessions from the CDU, who initially had wanted to maintain the
status quo. Consequently, it is hard to generalise from this ﬁnding and further
research is needed that considers the quality of pledge fulﬁlment – as a measure of
legislative concessions.
138 GERMAN POLITICS
This study went beyond existing studies by going further than just comparing the
input-output-linkage and by prying open the black box of decision making in coalitions.
The analysis has shown that fewer pledges of the minority government parties entered
the coalition agreement. Coalition partners without a legislative majority and who have
to manage high uncertainty appear to act with restraint when drafting the coalition
agreement. A coalition agreement of narrow scope avoids failure and signals to the
opposition parties that there is an open negotiation-arena.
These ﬁndings have important implications for understanding legislative effec-
tiveness and political representation in times of high uncertainty. First, this study
has provided further evidence that minority governments are as effective as majority
governments (Crombez 1996; Thomson et al. 2017) – at least for the time that they
are in ofﬁce. On average, both governments had enacted a third of their original
pledges in less than half of their terms (two out of ﬁve years). Even still, minority
governments remain a complex phenomenon. In absolute terms, minority govern-
ments have a poorer performance when compared to majority governments
because they are often terminated before the end of the legislative term (Lijphart
2012, 125), as was the case for the red-green minority government studied.
However, this study’s interest was to analyse how effective minority governments
are during the time that they are in ofﬁce, and it showed that the minority government
parties were not disadvantaged in at least partially fulﬁlling their pledges. Conse-
quently, with regard to promissory representation at the regional level (Mansbridge
2003; Pétry et al. 2015), both cabinets have proved to be equally responsible with
respect to pledge fulﬁlment. Second, the difference in quality of pledge fulﬁlment
that has been found is not necessarily synonymous with a worse performance.
Instead, one might argue that minority governments give opposition parties opportu-
nities to inﬂuence policy making – and the revival of parliamentary deliberation
amongst parties with different ideologies has a strong normative desirability in
democratic regimes (Strøm 1990; Powell 2000; Lijphart 2012; Ganghof 2015).
Third, with regard to differences in coalition contracting, comprehensive coalition
agreements are obviously not the only methods that can be used to coordinate
intra-coalition policy making and combat the moral hazard problems that arise as a
result of delegation to ministers (Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). Government
parties that have no majority in parliament also anticipate that further bargaining
may be necessary in the legislative arena, and so they limit themselves when commu-
nicating common political visions to their voters and the other parties in parliament.
Generalisation of the results is limited due to the small number of cases. Neverthe-
less, the choice of research design has provided a high control over extraneous variance.
More comparative studies on minority governments’ legislative performances,
especially those that look at quality of pledge fulﬁlment, are desirable. Such studies
should give attention to issues particular to minority governments; for example, how
they manage to build legislative majorities. More in-depth studies looking at legislative
decision making, and examining how minority governments and especially minority
coalitions adapt their behaviour, also have great potential to uncover further insights.
The ‘auto-limitation hypothesis’ when drafting the coalition agreement – suggested in
this paper, needs to be empirically tested in further studies.
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NOTES
1. Frequently, minority coalitions are thought to perform poorly (Bäck, Debus, and Dumont 2011;
Thomson et al. 2017); however until now, we have known little about how they actually work.
Thomson et al. (2017) consider four minority coalitions (of a total of 57 executives), but two of them
had a stable support partner, and consequently should be considered as ‘hidden majority governments’,
see (Strøm 1990, 94–99; Ganghof et al. 2012, 888). The two remaining minority coalitions in Italy and
Sweden were part of pre-coalitions with joint manifestos, and consequently coalition partners a priori
agreed on policies. This analysis provides evidence of party pledge fulﬁlment for a minority coalition
that did not have a stable support partner and where the governing parties were not part of pre-electoral
coalitions.
2. The original deﬁnition by Thomson et al. (2017) also includes outcome pledges that are excluded from
this analysis, see Chapter 3.3.
3. In some countries where minority governments are common, the practice of drafting of coalition agree-
ments was established relatively late (e.g. 1994 in Denmark), see Christiansen and Pedersen (2014, 4).
4. Indridason and Kristinsson (2013) argue that substantive minority coalitions do not draft coalition agree-
ments at all, but their empirical support for this argument is less convincing than that of other ﬁndings.
Obviously, there are substantive minority coalitions, for example in NRW and Denmark (Christiansen
and Pedersen 2014), where coalition agreements have been drafted.
5. Even though coalition agreements are not legally binding, they do not appear to be cheap talk. Empirical
evidence suggests that they are very good predictors of government parties’ legislative agendas. Moury
(2011) ﬁnds that most pledges included in coalition agreements in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy are
transferred into cabinet decisions, and studies of pledge fulﬁlment have shown that the likelihood of
enactment of elections pledges signiﬁcantly increases when they have been included in the coalition
agreement (Thomson 2001; Costello and Thomson 2008; Thomson et al. 2017). In addition, coalition
agreements appear to increase cabinet stability (Timmermans and Moury 2006; Krauss 2018).
6. Some empirical evidence for a narrow scope of coalition agreements in situations of high uncertainty has
been already provided by Müller and Strøm (2010), but in their study the scope of a coalition agreement
is measured by its length and not in terms of its content, and minority governments are not explicitly
addressed.
7. In this sense, concentrating on legislation is a very stringent test. In order to avoid having to pass legis-
lation, the minority government could try to implement policies without legal approval – which the min-
ority government in NRW did indeed attempt.
8. ‘Contract parliamentarism’ (Bale and Bergman 2006).
9. The minority government enacted 59 bills during the time it was in ofﬁce. During the same time period,
the majority government passed fewer laws (46). One might object that it is unfair to restrict the majority
government to the same time period, because the minority government parties knew about their fragile
situation and may have rushed to complete as many projects as they could as soon as possible. However,
the results do not change when considering 13 more bills for the majority government (in order to reach
the same total of 59 bills).
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10. For the distinction between outcome and action pledges, see Naurin (2011, 55). One example of an
outcome pledge is the decrease in the rate of unemployment. If the goal is attained it is hard to determine
whether the promise was fulﬁlled due to a speciﬁc political measure or due to general economic growth.
11. I include this control variable as a precautionary measure, even though other analyses have provided evi-
dence that this probably does not have an effect (Thomson et al. 2017, 537).
12. The SPD controlled the ministries for ‘Innovation, Science and Research’ and ‘Work, Integration and
Social Affairs’, and the Greens held the ministry for ‘School and Training’. The CDU controlled the min-
istries for, Work, Health and Social Affairs’ and ‘School and Training’, and the FDP held the ministry for
‘Innovation, Science, Research and Technology’.
13. I have also estimated a multinominal logistic regression that considers all three values the dependent vari-
able can take (not, partially or fully supported). However, the results are not substantially different, so I
only present the results of the binary regression in the main text.
14. Thomson et al. (2017, 537) have found evidence that a pledge originating from a party which holds the
prime ministership is more likely to be enacted.
15. Also when “ministry” is taken out of the model, there is still no effect for “prime minister” – and vice
versa.
16. The Left Party had the most progressive position and wanted to abolish the existing system and unify
different schools into ‘one school for all’: a full-time day school until the 10th class level, without
any school grades and full integration of disabled children.
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